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INTRODUCTION
This Occasional Paper reproduces a chapter from
Professor Philip Hamburger's new book, Separation of
Church and State, published in the summer of 2002 by
Harvard University Press. The book argues that during
the past two centuries the adoption of the idea of separa-
tion between church and state has transformed American
conceptions of the religious liberty guaranteed by the
First Amendment.
Many Americans take the idea of separation between
church and state for granted. In an 1802 letter to the
Danbury Baptist Association, Thomas Jefferson declared
that the First Amendment built a wall of separation
between church and state. More recently, in 1947, the
U.S. Supreme Court adopted the wall of separation as the
foundation of its establishment clause jurisprudence. On
the basis of these apparently authoritative pronounce-
ments, Americans often assume that separation was the
religious liberty enshrined in the First Amendment.
Although judges have increasingly questioned separation,
the Supreme Court has never directly repudiated the
metaphor, and it remains a common focus of judicial
opinions and other discussions of religious liberty.
Against this background, Philip Hamburger explains
that separation was not the religious liberty guaranteed by
the First Amendment. The First Amendment created a
barrier against a government establishment of religion,
but it was not designed to separate church and state.
Indeed, separation came to be adopted as a constitutional
principle only later, during the course of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries.
Chapter 8, reproduced here, explores how in the
mid-nineteenth century, separation between church and
state first became widely celebrated as an American con-
stitutional principle. Strikingly, it grew to be popular not
through concern about protecting religious minorities,
but through majority prejudice.
Other chapters explore a broad range of topics
including the liberty sought by early religious dissenters,
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the wording of the First Amendment's establishment
clause, Thomas Jefferson's 1802 letter to the Baptists, the
place of atheists in the evolution of religious liberty, the
role of the Ku Klux Klan in advocating separation, and
the views of Justice Hugo Black. These and other portions
of Professor Hamburger's book reveal how the antiestab-
lishment religious liberty of the First Amendment was
gradually transformed into a separation of church and
state. In particular, they reveal how theological suspicion
and intolerance have reshaped religious liberty, leaving
minority rights to be interpreted in terms of a metaphor
popularized through its appeal to the prejudices of a
majority.
The University of Chicago Law School is grateful to
Harvard University Press for permission to reprint
Professor Hamburger's chapter 8, which is printed here
without footnotes.
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A THEOLOGICALLY LIBERAL,
ANI-CATHOLIC, AND
AMERICAN PRINCIPLE
In the middle of the nineteenth century some
Americans employed the idea of separation of church and
state against Catholicism and thereby made it a popular
"American" principle. During the beginning of the centu-
ry, as has been seen, some secular political writers had
occasionally advocated separation as a constitutional prin-
ciple in a spirit that was recognizably Republican-that
was anticlerical but not specifically anti-Catholic. By the
middle of the century, however, Protestants began to
employ separation in a manner more likely to have wide-
spread appeal. Eager to prevent the Catholic Church from
exercising political or religious authority in America, many
Protestants were all too willing to perceive their religious
liberty as a separation of church and state, and increasing
numbers of Protestant leaders therefore opposed the
Catholic "union" of church and state by urging a separa-
tion of these institutions. Of course, American Protestants
had long differentiated between church and state and had
justified their religious liberty with related distinctions
concerning the limited jurisdiction of civil government.
Therefore, many of the Protestants who began to assert a
separation of church and state probably assumed that they
were not making any significant change. Nonetheless, in
demanding the separation of church and state and claim-
ing that it was a constitutional principle, they took a
momentous step, for they thereby initiated a redefinition
of American religious liberty.
When advocating separation against Catholics,
Protestant Americans voiced not only a fear of the
Church's temporal power but also, more fundamentally,
an individualistic suspicion of its theological authority.
Even more than the church's secular power, its assertions
of theological authority seemed incompatible with free-
dom-especially with the individual independence and
personal authority that were increasingly felt to be at the
core of Protestant and American identity-and, in this
respect, anti-Catholic demands for separation echoed and
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drew upon liberal Protestant rejections of creeds. Reacting
to the hierarchical, group claims of Catholicism,
Protestants ever more emphatically defined themselves,
their citizenship, their religion, and their liberty in terms
of their individualism and independence, and, in separa-
tion's limits on churches as well as government, these
Americans found the most positive articulation of what
their increasingly individualistic religious and civil identity
implied for the Catholic Church and eventually other reli-
gious groups.
LIBERAL PROTESTANTISM AND ITS CHALLENGE
To AUTHORITY
In America anti-Catholicism adopted some of the
assumptions of liberal theology. American anti-
Catholicism developed in response to many circumstances
and came in many varieties, but much of what distin-
guished it from European anti-Catholicism was the degree
to which it flourished with the growth of liberal Protestant
ideas and became an avenue for liberal rejections of ecclesi-
astical authority. Rather than follow the path of European
liberals in going to extremes of anti-Christian skepticism,
American liberals explored the further reaches of individu-
alistic Protestantism and questioned the authority of
churches, clergymen, and creeds. They thereby developed
an antiecclesiastical perspective, from which growing num-
bers of Protestants, whether or not theologically liberal,
perceived the Catholic Church as a threat to individual
mental freedom. In particular, Protestants could put aside
their own differences over liberal theology and could unite
by adopting a theologically liberal stance against
Catholicism. As Rabbi Isaac Wise remarked about the
anti-Catholic prejudice of his Protestant contemporaries:
"The liberality of the Protestant churches is something
unknown and strange."
American Protestants had departed from established
churches, including those of Rome and Canterbury, but
now increasing numbers of American Protestants ques-
tioned the authority of entirely disestablished Protestant
churches. Most evangelicals belonged to churches that
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retained creeds, clergies, and structures of church disci-
pline. Nonetheless, ever more Protestants felt their indi-
vidual liberty to require a freedom not only from govern-
ment but also from their own purely voluntary religious
societies.
In effect, these Protestants declined to distinguish
between what one minister, Samuel Lothrop, called
"internal" and "external" religious liberty. The external
was the liberty "which the individual claims of the govern-
ment as a civil right, and relates to the extent of his
exemption from penalties, privations or disabilities, on
account either of his articles of faith, or modes of wor-
ship." In contrast, the internal was "the liberty which the
individual claims of the church or ecclesiastical body, and
relates to his freedom to form and express his own opin-
ions of religious truth, without loss of religious privileges
and fellowship, on account of those opinions." The New
England establishments had most clearly threatened the
external liberty, but, with the decline of these establish-
ments in the early nineteenth century, Unitarians in par-
ticular demanded internal as well as external liberty and,
indeed, hardly differentiated them. In the words of
William Ellery Channing-the most prominent advocate
of internal liberty:
There are countless ways by which men in a free
country may encroach on their neighbors'
rights. In religion the instrument is ready made
and always at hand. I refer to Opinion, com-
bined and organized in sects, and swayed by the
clergy. We say we have no Inquisition. But a
sect, skillfully organized, trained to utter one
cry, combined to cover with reproach whoever
may differ from themselves, to drown the free
expression of opinion by denunciations of
heresy, and strike terror into the multitude by
joint and perpetual menace,-such a sect is as
perilous and palsying to the intellect as the
Inquisition.
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Fearing that individuals would "lose themselves in mass-
es," "identify themselves with parties and sects," and "sac-
rifice individuality," Channing urged an "Inward" or
mental freedom from "the bondage of habit," from the
slavery of "precise rules," and from anything by which the
"mind" might be "merged in others." Channing was sec-
onded by many others, such as Bernard Whitman, who
more concretely argued that "the use made of human
creeds by the leaders of the orthodox denomination is
subversive of free inquiry, religious liberty, and the princi-
ples of Congregationalism." What often was at stake in
practical terms was whether Unitarian congregants could
be prevented from obtaining control of church buildings
and other property-whether they could be stopped from
taking over a congregation and changing its doctrine. Yet
more than property was in dispute. As the New England
establishments passed into oblivion, at issue was whether
the creeds of even voluntary religious societies should be
feared as threats to liberty.
This Unitarian demand for liberty from not only
civil government but also Congregational churches was
part of a broader liberal challenge to ecclesiastical authori-
ty, which no denomination could escape. For example, the
assault on church authority found its way into that bas-
tion of Presbyterian orthodoxy, the Princeton Theological
Seminary. In May 1824, when the Seminary invited the
Rev. John M. Duncan of Baltimore to preach the annual
discourse to students, he disparaged "subjugation" to "sec-
tarian principles" as an impediment to "ministerial liber-
ty." This was quite unexpected, and, in response,
Professor Samuel Miller felt obliged to introduce the
Seminary's summer session with a lecture in defense of
creeds and confessions of faith. "If every christian were a
mere insulated individual, who inquired, felt and acted
for himself alone, no Creed of human formation would be
necessary for his advancement in knowledge, comfort or
holiness." Yet "the case is far otherwise," for Christians
were not so insulated and did not act for themselves
alone. "The church is a society; a society which, however
extended, is 'one body in Christ,' and all who compose it,
'members one of another."' Moreover, the members of a
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religious society surely had a "privilege to judgefor them-
selves; to agree upon the plan of their own association; to
determine upon what principles they will receive other
members into their brotherhood." Miller's vigorous
defense of creeds suggests the degree to which even tradi-
tional Presbyterians felt they had to fight off manifesta-
tions of liberal theology.
Much later, in 1877, the Scottish-born Baptist
preacher, George Lorimer, who preached at the Tremont
Temple in Boston, would look back and complain about
the ways in which religious liberty had been taken beyond
a freedom from the state:
[F]or half a century or longer, and especially in
our day, efforts have been made to give it a
wider, and, in some cases, a misleading applica-
tion.... There is a tendency, more wide-spread
than is generally supposed, to complain that
articles of faith cramp intellectual liberty, and
that the laws and rules of religious communities
restrict unduly inclination and action. In the
name of liberty, ... fixity is unfixed, and the
solidities of Christian societies reduced to a state
of flux.
This rejection of creeds and discipline in "the name of lib-
erty" was an "evil.. .not confined to any particular denom-
ination." On the contrary: "It shows itself among the
Presbyterians and Episcopalians, as distinctly as among
the Congregationalists and Baptists." Pervading American
denominations, it was a suspicion of clerical authority
that Protestant clergymen (even those who were not theo-
logically liberal) would soon redirect against Catholicism,
especially after they felt its sting themselves.
Evangelical Protestant clergymen learned about the
necessity of deflecting sharply liberal and anticlerical sus-
picions when these ministers attempted to influence
American politics in naively imprudent ways. In the
1820s and 1830s, as the New England establishments col-
lapsed, and as Protestants increasingly cooperated without
fear of legal inequalities, evangelicals sought, through the
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power of Christian opinion, to establish a Christian soci-
ety or nation-to substitute a voluntary and harmonizing
moral establishment in place of the coercive and divisive
legal establishments. In so doing, they hoped to persuade
legislatures to adopt secular laws on matters of moral and
social importance, and they assumed that their advocacy
of such laws would pose no threat to freedom. Indeed,
they hoped to reinforce freedom's moral foundations.
Other Americans, however, objected to these clerical for-
ays into politics, fearing that clerical influence, even on
behalf of laws that did not establish religion, might
encourage dangerous clerical ambitions.
In the late 1820s these opponents of clerical influ-
ence found a tangible object for their fears in the Rev.
Ezra Stiles Ely-a Presbyterian and the organizer of the
Sunday School Union, who lacked the gentle character of
his namesake. On July 4, 1827, in Philadelphia, this
imprudent clergyman boldly preached that Christians
should form a "union of church and state." Far from
being a legal union, it was to be "a new sort of Union; or,
if you please, a Christian party in politics, ... not by sub-
scribing a constitution and the formation of a new society,
... but by adopting, avowing and determining to act upon,
truly religious principles in all civil matters." By sheer
numbers rather than by law, "[w]e are a Christian nation:
we have the right to demand that all our rulers in their
conduct shall conform to Christian morality; and if they
do not, it is the duty and privilege of Christian freemen to
make a new and a better election." Ely emphasized that "I
do not wish any religious test to be prescribed by constitu-
tion and proposed to a man on his acceptance of any pub-
lic trust." Instead, "[1]et it only be granted, that Christians
have the same rights and privileges in exercising the elec-
tive franchise which are accorded to Jews and Infidels."
Ely believed that, "[w]hile every religious opinion is toler-
ated and no one is established by law, it is still possible for
me to think, that the friend of Christianity, will make a
much better governor of the United States, than the advo-
cate of Theism or Polytheism." He asked, "Are Christians
the only men in the community who may not be guided
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by their judgment, conscience, and choice, in electing
their rulers?"
Ely's emphasis upon a "union of church and state"
and "a Christian party in politics" was singularly ill-
chosen. He sought no legal establishment, and, at a time
when all denominations had abandoned their pretensions
to a legal superiority, he merely described an evangelical
alliance of a sort that was already occurring without much
objection. Yet he adopted phrases that revived among
other denominations all of their old suspicions about the
intolerance of the Presbyterians. Accordingly, the follow-
ing year, when Ely sought an act incorporating his Sunday
School Union, Jacksonians in the state legislature defeated
his proposal on the ground that he sought a religious
tyranny. Typical of the Jacksonian protests was a placard
denouncing Ely's "UNION OF CHURCH AND STATE." In the
view of one contemporary "all that was wanting to make
it perfect was to have a likeness of poor Dr. Ely placed at
the top in the shape of a Pope."
The Jacksonians and theological liberals who joined
in the condemnations of the Rev. Ely soon protested even
more vocally against the clerical opponents of Sunday
mails. In 1829 and 1830 evangelical clergymen petitioned
the U.S. Congress to end the delivery of mail on Sundays
by the United States Post Office. To their astonishment,
these ministers elicited as much fear as sympathy.
Numerous Americans sent counter-petitions, and when
Congress rejected the clergy's attempt to prevent Sunday
mails, Senator Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky-an ally
and friend of President Jackson-wrote committee reports
that echoed and amplified popular fears of clerical influ-
ence. "All religious despotism commences by combination
and influence; and when that influence begins to operate
upon the political institutions of a country, the civil
power soon bends under it; and the catastrophe of other
nations furnishes an awful warning of the consequence.
The history of Christianity revealed that "many of its pro-
fessors, as soon as clothed with political power, lost the
meek spirit which their creed inculcated, and began to
inflict on other religions, and on dissenting sects of their
own religion, persecutions more aggravated than those
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which their own apostles had endured"-a point Johnson
illustrated with "massacres and murders perpetrated by
Christian hands," the "holy inquisition," and the danger of
"[t]he bigot, in the pride of his authority." Accordingly, in
1832, when Johnson ran for vice president, the New York
labor leader Ely Moore could claim that Johnson "has
done more for liberal principles... than any man in our
country-by arresting the schemes of an ambitious, irreli-
gious priesthood. Charge him not with hostility to the
principles of religion, because he opposed the wishes and
thwarted the designs of the clergy." Observing such
responses to the Rev. Ely and the opponents of Sunday
mails, evangelical Protestants had ample opportunity to
contemplate the risks of asserting clerical and church
authority.
The assaults on the Protestant authority portended ill
for Catholics. Protestants had long despised the Catholic
Church. Yet the theologically liberal attacks by Protestants
upon their own churches gave the animus against the
Catholic Church an altered character and force. As evan-
gelical clergymen in the 1820s and 1830s came under
criticism for their attempts to assert moral leadership
beyond their churches, these ministers increasingly took
gratification in pointing to the dangerous authority
claimed by the Catholic Church. Being themselves the
object of liberal and anticlerical suspicions, these ministers
welcomed the opportunity to deflect such sentiments
toward Rome, and their conduct suggests how Protestants
divided over theological liberalism could join together in
adopting a theologically liberal attitude against the
Catholic Church. Most dramatically, Presbyterians could
hope to lead their fellow Protestants in the new voluntary
or moral establishment of Christianity in America not by
asserting church authority, but rather by opposing the
authority claimed for Catholicism. In such ways liberal
suspicions of authority simultaneously divided Protestants
among themselves and united them against Rome.
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ANTI-CATHOLICISM
Although American Protestants had long felt a pro-
found animus against the Catholic Church, they gave this
antagonism new intensity in the nineteenth century. They
had inherited some very traditional fears about the anti-
Christian character of Catholicism and its union of
church and state. In addition, they now combined these
with more modern, theologically liberal anxieties about
Catholic ecclesiastical authority and its threat to individ-
ual mental freedom. Viewing themselves as intellectually
independent individuals, who followed their consciences
rather than the authority of any church or priest, many
Protestants assumed that the Catholic Church, because of
its apparent threat to intellectual independence, was all
the more likely to obtain political power and revive a
medieval intolerance. In response to this combination of
liberal and more traditional fears, Protestants would even-
tually elevate separation of church and state as an
American ideal.
Much anti-Catholicism had little to do with religion.
In the 1830s and especially the 1840s and 1850s,
Catholic immigrants from Germany and especially Ireland
arrived in the United States by the thousands and eventu-
ally the hundreds of thousands each year. Crowding into
America's cities, most were destitute and had little famil-
iarity with American ways. Those from Ireland, moreover,
belonged to an ethnic group not traditionally beloved by
Americans of English and Scottish descent, and numerous
Protestants complained of both the indolence of the Irish
and their economic competition. Fearful of the foreigners,
many native-born Protestants self-consciously identified
themselves with America and its native population and,
on this basis, these "nativists" opposed foreign immigra-
tion, especially by Irish Catholics. Yet even this sort of sec-
ular ethnic and class animosity often blended into the reli-
gious prejudice that would do so much to popularize the
separation of church and state. For example, in displaying
his solicitude for Irish Catholics, one Protestant hoped
that "when drunkenness shall have been done away, and,
with it, that just, relative proportion of all indolence,
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ignorance, crime, misery, and superstition, of which it is
the putative parent; then truly a much smaller portion of
mankind may be expected to follow the dark lanthern of
the Romish religion."
American Protestants often expressed their revulsion
against Catholicism in remarkably traditional theological
ways. Like numerous other Protestants since the
Reformation, Americans of various denominations com-
plained about the pope and the Church of Rome in terms
drawn from the Book of Revelation. For example, a mid-
nineteenth-century Presbyterian speaker on church histo-
ry declared "the Pope of Rome to be Anti-Christ" and, on
this ground, concluded that "his ministers must be
excluded from the Christian ministry." Far from being the
Christian Church, Rome was not even one such church.
It was, instead, an eschatological machine of intoler-
ance-"the scarlet harlot, riding on the beast with seven
heads and ten horns.. .drunk with the blood of saints."
Commenting on these utterly commonplace remarks, a
Southern Baptist reviewer confidently added: "This is
most unquestionably so and all Protestant sects so affirm."
As even this reviewer understood, he may have been too
optimistic about his fellow Protestants, for many, regret-
tably, might "shrink from" these conclusions.
Nonetheless, vast numbers of Protestants shared the suspi-
cions of the reviewer, and a newspaper published in
Philadelphia and New York from 1834 through 1837
could flourish under the title, The Downfall ofBabylon; or,
the Triumph of Truth over Popery. Thus Catholics had
ample reason to worry that "the American people have
inherited, even in their political freedom, the prejudices
of their ancestors."
Yet this very old-fashioned Protestant revulsion
against Catholicism could find more modern expression
in an evolving Protestant, Enlightenment, and eventually,
liberal redefinition of religion. In distinguishing them-
selves from Catholics, Protestants had long emphasized
justification by faith alone, and they gave even greater
emphasis to belief when, in the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries, they increasingly contrasted their consci-
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entious gospel beliefs to the hypocrisy and human inter-
positions of the Catholic Church. In England and
America, where Protestant dissenters struggled against
established Protestant churches, the dissenters asserted
religious liberty by focusing on the importance of freedom
of conscience, and they thereby appeared, in some of their
petitions for freedom, much closer than they really were
to the position that unimpeded belief was the only essen-
tial in religion. By the nineteenth century some
Protestants-not only Unitarians but also others-came
close to reducing their religion to freedom, as when the
expansive Congregationalist, Leonard Bacon, declared in
1845 that "Protestantism is the love ofSpiritual Liberty."
Implicitly, such a claim called into question the religious
character of a church that did not give theological promi-
nence to faith and freedom of individual conscience. In
addition, some Enlightenment Protestants attempted to
reconcile religion and reason by accentuating what could
be inferred from reason and by reducing religion to what
was reasonable. Associating reason with the purity of their
own faith, Protestants condemned Catholicism as not
only unfree but also irrational and superstitious-thereby
joining earlier Protestants who classed it with the mum-
mery and horrors of paganism. A worship of things
human, in response to terrors knowingly inculcated by
priests, Catholicism seemed a cynical invention imposed
by force and mental stultification rather than a free, ratio-
nal, and pure faith. In these ways (usually for limited,
polemical purposes) many Protestants came to view their
own religion and, indeed, religion itself as essentially a
matter of conscientious faith and the freedom necessary
for this-a perspective with which they could attractively
identify Protestantism as the foundation for rational
inquiry, truth, morality, and progress. It was an astonish-
ingly broad view of Protestantism and a remarkably nar-
row conception of religion, and, in accord with more ven-
erable condemnations of the Whore of Babylon, it sug-
gested that Catholicism-"this system of so-called reli-
gion"-was not a religion at all.
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American fears were not limited to either eschatolog-
ical terror about the Whore and the Beast or enlighten-
ment revulsion against unfree and irrational superstition,
for the Church, through its temporal power and union of
church and state, had long seemed to threaten, in a very
worldly way, both religious and political liberty. In parts
of both the Old World and the New, the Church had the
direct power or at least the influence to stifle and punish
religious dissent, and, although it did so with only a shad-
ow of its former vigor, it thereby seemed to confirm that it
still lusted after temporal power. Nursed for centuries on
stories of martyrs burning at Smithfield, English
Protestants had long viewed Catholic political ambition
with trepidation. They carefully preserved memories of
the Gunpowder Plot and numerous other treacheries, real
and imagined, and feared even their tiny Catholic minori-
ty on the ground that it seemed to pay allegiance to a for-
eign temporal prince. English governments tended to rec-
ognize that most Catholics posed no threat, but the
Protestant populace was by no means so confident.
Blending distant history with present reality, and fantasy
with fact, their fears of Catholic power and treachery
became the inheritance of American Protestants-a legacy
somewhat neglected during the late eighteenth century
but increasingly regarded with appreciation. Particularly
as Catholic immigrants populated the western states, and
as Catholic missionaries boldly tried to convert other
Americans, Protestants feared that Catholics would
attempt to subvert representative government or would
even gain enough adherents to impose religious tyranny
by democratic means. On this reasoning innumerable
American Protestants, like their English predecessors,
argued that, to prevent Catholics from capturing free,
Protestant government and imposing a union of church
and state, Catholics had to be denied equal civil and polit-
ical rights unless they first renounced their allegiance to
the pope.
This denial of rights was harsh, but it seemed fully
justified by the threat of Catholic beliefs. In the prior cen-
tury Jefferson had argued that civil government should
not penalize opinion because there was "time enough for
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the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to
interfere when principles break out into overt acts against
peace and good order." Vast numbers of Americans, how-
ever, held that civil government had to interfere before
Catholic principles broke out into overt acts.
Of course, Catholicism was not, in reality, so mono-
lithic, powerful, or dangerous. For example, Irish immi-
grants had various traditions about temporal power,
including at least one that denounced the adulterous con-
nection between church and state. Such was the perspec-
tive espoused on behalf of Catholics in Ireland by an Irish
barrister, Charles Phillips, whose speeches-running
through at least nine American editions between 1817
and 1823-seem to have been widely read by Irish
Catholic immigrants. Phillips confessed that "there was a
day, when I was bigoted as the blackest." No longer. In
particular, he now declaimed against a parliamentary bill
that offered Catholics toleration on odious terms. Like
earlier proposals for toleration, the bill granted Catholics
the civil privileges they had long been denied (such as the
right to vote or hold office), provided they took oaths dis-
claiming allegiance to the pope. In response, Phillips
urged Irish Catholics that "the time is come to give that
calumny the lie, which represents you as subservient to a
foreign influence." Irish Catholics, Phillips said, deferred
to the spiritual authority of the pope but not to any
claims for his temporal authority and thus were both good
Catholics and loyal subjects of the crown. Were the pon-
tiff to interfere with the civil allegiance of Irish
Catholics-which, according to Phillips, he surely would
not do-they would distinguish between their religious
and civil duties: "Separating, as we do, our civil rights
from our spiritual duties, we humbly desire that they may
not be confounded." Phillips emphasized this separation,
arguing that the ungenerous Emancipation Bill "was suit-
ed to increase" the "anti-Christian connexion between
church and state," which had "done more mischief to the
Gospel interests, than all the ravings of infidelity since the
crucifixion." Echoing Paine, he explained: "It is at best
but a foul and adulterous connexion, polluting the purity
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of heaven with the abomination of earth, and hanging the
tatters of a political piety upon the cross of an insulted
Saviour."
With or without the benefit of reading Phillips's
speeches, American Catholics, including even bishops,
often adopted a liberalized, American understanding of
their Church. For example, in the 1830s John England,
bishop of Charleston, argued in his pastoral letters that in
America "the duty of a Roman Catholic legislator is to be
regulated by the power which is conferred upon him. His
duty is to legislate only for the temporal welfare of the
State, not upon the religious concerns of the people.... It
would on his part be an usurpation, which would be
criminal, to use his power openly or covertly for the
checking of heresy, or the elevation of his own Church."
Indeed, he explained that the pope's temporal power in
Europe was distinct from his spiritual power within the
Church and that "the Pope's authority" as head of the
Church "is merely of a spiritual nature and can never
interfere with the temporal authority of our government."
In a similar spirit American Catholics frequently went out
of their way to demonstrate their love of freedom. For
example, in 1848 they organized a meeting to declare
their happiness that the pope himself had adopted a
"Liberal Policy" toward the independence of Italy-a cele-
bration for which they carefully solicited support from
notable Protestants.
More fundamentally, as a Baptist writer, Thomas
Curtis, acknowledged, Catholics in America increasingly
felt individualistic expectations, albeit within a system
that remained hierarchical: "In the United States,... we
find a variety of the Roman Catholic religion springing up
vastly different from that even of Ireland. We find lay
trustees of Catholic Churches capable, sometimes by
themselves, of resisting the priesthood. We find the
Douay Bible more generally permitted, sermons more fre-
quent and confessions more rare." In particular, Catholics
were beginning to partake of the "public sentiment, and
the unwritten Christianity of the country" that seemed "to
suggest instinctively that none ought to be received as full
members of any church, or regarded as true Christians,
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with whom sound morality and steady piety is not a mat-
ter of established personal influence and supremacy." As a
result, "the priest is no longer the mere tool of the bishop,
nor the layman of the priest," It was "not simply that both
are more free, but also that both have a stronger sense of
direct personal responsibility to God; not simply that the
layman will not perform what he considers an arbitrary
penance, but that he will claim his right to read the Word
of God."
Yet even amid this gradual Americanization of
Catholics, many Catholic leaders did anything but allay
the fears of Protestants. Indeed, Catholic leaders vigorous-
ly asserted extreme positions, which spurred Protestants to
their own excesses. In Europe, as the popes lost their tem-
poral power, they asserted it all the more vigorously, and,
echoing papal views, many American Catholic leaders
repeatedly spoke of dominating the nation in religion and
even politics. Bishop Hughes of New York declared:
"Everybody should know that we have for our mission to
convert the world-including the inhabitants of the
United States-the people of the cities, and the people of
the country, the officers of the navy and the marines,
commanders of the army, the Legislatures, the Senate, the
Cabinet, the President, and all!" Such ambitions for con-
version were frightening enough, but they were accompa-
nied by direct challenges to religious liberty. For example,
Orestes Brownson wrote that "we assert the most rigid
theological intolerance, and the wisdom and justice of the
political intolerance which nobody denies was during
many centuries asserted, and sometimes practiced, by
Catholic states." Brownson hastened to qualify this intol-
erance by explaining that a different policy was appropri-
ate in a modern era-that "we are bound by Catholic
principles to assert for our times the toleration of all reli-
gions." This hardly reassured Protestants, however, who
worried about future times, when Catholics might attain a
majority. Confirming Protestant fears, the St. Louis
Shepherd of the Valley bluntly declared: "The Church, we
admit, is, of necessity, intolerant... Her intolerance fol-
lows necessarily from her claim of infallibility; she alone
has the right to be intolerant.... Heresy... she
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endures...when and where she must, but she hates it and
directs all her energies to effect its destruction....If the
Catholics ever gain... an immense numerical superiority,
religious freedom in this country is at an end. So say our
enemies. So we believe." Although the premise of a
numerical superiority was improbable, Catholics and
Protestants readily contemplated its consequences.
While Catholics indulged in these astonishing
claims, Protestants could rationalize their terror about a
Catholic plot to overturn republican government. A
nativist paper observed that "the Church itself avows its
political character and intentions, and boldly asserts that
it will succeed in accomplishing its nefarious purpose." It
was only prudent to worry that "the Pope and his adher-
ents have formed the deliberate design of obtaining the
ascendancy in the United States," if "Popish priests and
editors make no secret of this design, and expect its real-
ization at no distant day." Thus the Church's intempered
ambitions seemed to justify a new version of an old fear-
the Protestant nightmare of treason and torture, disloyalty
and despotism, now coming to life, incongruously, in the
daylight of modern American democracy, a Roman
imperium in the democratic imperio. Catholic mobs,
which violently disrupted nativist meetings, and Catholic
gangs, which mixed crime with politics, seemed to con-
firm the threat. Although some American Catholics, not
least some bishops, tried to calm Protestant anxieties, they
could not suppress the unrealistic hopes of many
Catholics and the morbid apprehensions of Protestants.
Not only the Church's claims of temporal power but
also its claims of authority in purely religious matters
seemed oppressive, and, in this sense, the objection to
Catholicism was as much theological as political. The
Church claimed authority to interpret the Bible and to
demand faith in Catholic dogma and thereby seemed, to
many Protestants, to violate the consciences of individu-
als, who had a right to think for themselves. Echoing ear-
lier liberal attacks upon their own creeds and clergy,
Presbyterians and Congregationalists led the assault on the
Catholic hierarchy as "the foe of mental liberty," arguing,
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in the words of a Presbyterian, John Breckinridge, that the
"Roman Catholic Church in America is anti-American,
anti-liberal." It was so fixed in its dogma that it "cannot
become liberal, and they [Catholics] will not renounce it;
and here we join issue-here we fix our final opposition
to it, as anti-American, as well as anti-Christian." In par-
ticular, Protestants argued that the Church required a
"substitution of authority for conscience." As the Rev.
Samuel Barnum later summarized, "[t]he denial of the
right of private judgment...and the alleged supremacy
and infallibility of the pope.. logically involve (so
Protestants think) the substitution of a corporate or for-
eign or artificial 'conscience' (so-called) in the place of
that conscience which God has put into every man to bear
witness for Him." This denial of private judgment
appeared all the more stultifying among recent immi-
grants, whose social cohesion often reinforced their defer-
ence to clerical authority. Against these foreign-born
Americans, Samuel F. B. Morse-the frustrated painter
who found greater success as an inventor and bigot-
declared that Catholics were "human priest-controlled
machines." In more conventional terms, "Junius
Americus" held that Protestantism and Catholicism were
"essentially opposite....The former admits diversity of
opinions, and freedom in the enjoyment of those opin-
ions: the latter demands that there shall be but one faith."
As a result, in the words of John Breckinridge, the
Catholic Church was "the only church in America in
which perfect uniformity prevails; and whose members all
speak one language and breathe one spirit. The agitated
and heterogeneous mass of protestantism can never feel,
think, or act together; though each of the thousand and
one sects were ever so well disposed to govern the nation."
Whereas Protestants were free and resisted mental confor-
mity, "[a] real 'Catholic' is another name for a slave for
life." From such a perspective, a Yale-educated
Presbyterian, Henry A. Boardman, preached, with no
irony, in 1855: "The servitude of the laity to the priest-
hood, is in some respects the most complete slavery of
which the world furnishes any example-for it is the slav-
ery of the conscience."
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In questioning Catholic claims of authority,
Protestants found a means of transcending the differences
within and among their own churches. The last remaining
establishments-those of Connecticut and
Massachusetts-had been abolished in 1818 and 1833,
and, no longer divided by the special privileges once
accorded establishments, the Protestant majority could
finally sense its unity as the dominant religious and moral
voice of the nation. Accordingly, the old vision of a soci-
ety unified in its Christianity-a perspective once much
beloved by establishments-seemed to find new possibili-
ties in America's freedom, permitting evangelicals to
assert, without any sense of contradiction, their devotion
to individual religious freedom and their satisfaction in
belonging to a nation harmonized by its Protestantism.
Yet dissensions over liberal theology and innumerable
other issues flourished at the same time as the evangelical
dream of unity, and as different denominations increas-
ingly indulged in internal quarrels, they found anti-
Catholicism all the more important for its capacity to
bind them together. John Forney-the prominent
Democratic newspaper editor-observed that "while an
attempt is made to combine all other religious denomina-
tions against the Catholic Church,.. .the very denomina-
tions thus sought to be combined, are torn with all man-
ner of dissensions," and, against these divisions, anti-
Catholicism was a cohesive force. Anti-Catholic writers
encouraged Protestants to join forces across denomina-
tional lines in their hopes of "extending light throughout
our yet happy America, and of thus arresting the efforts of
Rome to spread over the western continent, the darkness,
the superstition and the mental and spiritual thraldom of
the middle ages." On such a basis, "all Protestants should
unite in the conflict with Rome." Having long been
accused of oppressing fellow Protestants,
Congregationalists and Presbyterians could now vindicate
themselves by rushing to the forefront of the crusade
against Catholicism and turning the accusation of oppres-
sion against Catholics. It was an approach that allowed
them the gratification and advantage of inveighing against
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tyranny while, in fact, reclaiming a role of leadership and
authority among Protestants. Presbyterians and
Congregationalists, however, were hardly on their own.
Clergymen from almost all denominations joined the
assault on Catholicism in one way or another, making
anti-Catholicism the shared religious expression of an oth-
erwise increasingly fragmented Protestant majority.
As if this were not enough, many Protestants took
prurient pleasure in lurid tales of sexual excess by Catholic
priests-stories that excited Protestant fears for both polit-
ical and mental liberty. Unnaturally deprived of conjugal
satisfactions, priests were said to have their way in con-
vents and to employ the rite of confession to seduce
young virgins. "NUNNERIES" had "uniformly been prisons
to the inmates, and generally brothels for the priests," who
pursued their insatiable sexual desires and then covered up
their crimes by murdering unwanted babies and the nuns
who sought freedom. What priests enjoyed by physical
force in convents, they also obtained by spiritual seduc-
tion in confessionals. A woman "was wax in her spiritual
director's hands; she has ceased to be a person, and is
become a thing." Indeed, "Romish priests now in this coun-
try, hearing confessions perhaps at the moment I write,"
were "debauching their penitents, aye, even in New
England, the land of the pilgrims." Worrying about the
absolute power of the hierarchy, many Protestants saw
dangers to both freedom and purity threats in which
sexual anxieties about "our hitherto virtuous mothers and
chaste daughters" seemed intimately intertwined with reli-
gious and political fears for the nation. Thus the Church's
requirement of celibacy had consequences far beyond con-
vent walls, "convert[ing] monasteries, nunneries and
nations into one vast brothel." Through auricular confes-
sion, priests would "rivet the chains of slavery" on the
"souls as well as the bodies of men." In the confessional
"the priesthood" not only took advantage of innocent vir-
gins but also could, "at their discretion, exercise a more
thorough despotism than that of any Asiatic sovereign." A
fantasy of relentless sexual subjugation, this pornographic
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vision of despotism depicted the fate of the republic in the
hands of the priests.
Amid this hysteria, nativists urged the "inspection of
nunneries and convents." Eager for such inspection, a
Massachusetts House committee intruded itself so vigor-
ously into female Catholic institutions as to prompt even
a Protestant protest about unconstitutional searches (not
to mention less elevated discussion about the female com-
pany kept by one committee member when not inspect-
ing the nuns.) It was an occasion on which Orestes
Brownson's heightened rhetoric was thoroughly justified,
for the committee members seemed "to have been wholly
under the influence of their lecherous tastes and prurient
fancies, and to have imagined they were sent to visit a
brothel, and not the residence of reputable and highly
respectable ladies."
Aroused by religious prejudice, fears about political
and mental liberty, and fantasies about sexual violation,
American mobs violently attacked Catholics. In the 1830s
Protestants initiated the practice of burning down
Catholic churches, their most notorious achievement
being the destruction in 1834 of the Ursuline convent in
Charlestown, Massachusetts. For decades afterward,
Protestant mobs sporadically indulged in open conflict,
often stimulated by both settled ministers and less
respectable but gifted street preachers, such as the self-
proclaimed Angel Gabriel, who-dressed in a white robe
and announcing his presence with a brass horn-incited
Protestants to attack Catholics and torch their houses and
churches. In 1844, after an orchestrated campaign of anti-
Catholic preaching, Protestants in the city of brotherly
love ignited churches and battled against Catholics and
local military companies, sometimes using cannons, and
causing the streets to be "baptized in blood." A decade
later, in the mid-1850s, Protestants burned a dozen
churches in different towns. In Sidney, Ohio, and
Dorchester, Massachusetts, enterprising Protestants blew
up churches with gunpowder. Riots between nativists and
Catholic immigrants-often on the occasion of elec-
tions-left numerous injured and dead in the streets and
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engulfed portions of American cities, from Lawrence to
New Orleans and from Louisville to St. Louis. Observing
the mayhem in 1855, John Forney complained that
Protestant leaders sought a sort of political proscription,
"hunting down the Catholics as if they were so many wild
beasts." Bishop Hughes did not bother with a metaphor:
"Convents have been burned down....Catholic churches
have been burned down, while whole neighborhoods have
been, under the eye of the public officers, reduced to
ashes. People have been burned to death in their own
dwellings, or, if they attempted to escape, have been shot
down." In the midst of this arson, Hughes-who saved
Catholic churches in New York City by arming congre-
gants-asked "whether there be not some more Christian
mode of illuminating the minds of the 'Papists' than that
of burning their churches?"
Among fiery Protestant sermons, inflamed preju-
dices, and their very worldly consequences, Protestant
Americans increasingly defined themselves and their free-
dom in opposition to Catholicism. A nativist gift book
held that "the American idea is liberty, civil and religious:
whilst the Catholic idea is submission to the church, and
implicit obedience to all its behests." Contrasting the
papal and the republican systems, a leading nativist politi-
cian elaborated: "In the one, the individual is held to be a
free agent, social and religious; in the other, the individual
possesses not freedom either of conscience or allegiance."
As the editor of a Protestant journal put it already in
1835: "The abhorrence of papacy has become an instinct
almost-a part of our personal identity."
It was a personal identity that increasing numbers of
Americans asserted by doing what Tocqueville said they
did so effectively-by forming numerous associations,
albeit not of the sort that this political scientist hoped
would mitigate "the tyranny of the majority." In particu-
lar, they joined various "nativist" orders and political par-
ties that were organized on behalf of native-born
Protestants. Most notorious were the secretive Know
Nothings. Evolving out of the Order of the Star-Spangled
Banner, the Know Nothings acquired their peculiar name
23
because of their first-degree ritual, in which they swore
they would not disclose anything about the organization,
even binding themselves to deny any knowledge of its
existence. In this ceremony they vowed that they were
native-born Protestants and that they would "vote only for
native born American citizens... to the exclusion of
all.. .Roman Catholics." Of course, they also learned the
secret hand signal and secret handshake, which would
reveal their membership to fellow initiates. With such
vows and rituals, nativists could enjoy the satisfactions of
an intense fraternalism and a sense of independence from
Catholic conformity and submission.
In the intensity of these fears, images of religion and
nation merged. On July 4, 1844, when 70,000 Protestants
were said to have paraded through the streets of
Philadelphia to protest against Catholics, the Protestants
celebrated their ideals with banners depicting the Bible
and the Constitution, including one displaying "[a] bust
of the mother of Washington resting on a pedestal....An
eagle hovering over it, holding the American flag in its
beak, which fell in graceful folds over the bust and the
pedestal." Supporting this icon wrapped in a flag, the
pedestal displayed the inscription, "To Mary the mother
of Washington." In New York the American Republican
Party urged Americans "to congregate themselves around
the GREAT ALTAR of their common country." Typically,
however, nativist Protestants felt more fearful than tri-
umphant. Dreading Catholic domination, Protestants-
even as they terrorized Catholics-identified with
Reformation martyrs and imagined that they, their free-
dom, and thus their nation would be sacrificed to Roman
tyranny. Gazing upon a cross surmounting a church
spire, a Know Nothing was supposed to have imagined:
Upon that lofty cross methought I saw
The image of my country crucified.
24
PUBLICLY FUNDED SCHOOLS
The idea of separation of church and state first
attracted widespread support and even national attention
in 1840, when Protestants and Catholics in New York
City quarreled over public school funds. Upon arriving in
American from Ireland and elsewhere, many Catholics
settled in New York, and eventually they grew numerous
and confident enough to claim equal rights in receiving
public school funds. This presumptuous demand shocked
Protestants, many of whom responded by asserting separa-
tion of church and state as a constitutional principle.
The existing publicly funded schools in New York
City were, in fact, Protestant in character. In contrast to
the rest of New York State, which left public school funds
in the hands of local school districts that could adapt to
the needs of their populations, the city disbursed its funds
centrally. Since the early 1820s, when it first acquired
authority to distribute public school funds, New York's
City Council had denied such funds to all sectarian insti-
tutions, including Baptist, Methodist, and Catholic
schools, Instead, it gave most of its funds to the schools
run by the Public School Society-a privately operated
nondenominational organization. Yet the ostensibly non-
sectarian schools of the Public School Society had some
broadly Protestant, even if not narrowly sectarian, charac-
teristics. One goal of the Society was "to inculcate the
sublime truths of religion and morality contained in the
Holy Scriptures," and its schools required children to read
the King James Bible and to use textbooks in which
Catholics were condemned as deceitful, bigoted, and
intolerant. Catholics objected to what seemed to them lit-
tle more than publicly funded Protestant schools and
insisted that their own schools also receive public support.
In the circumstances, their demand that the city fund
Catholic schools was not clearly a request for a privilege
that Protestants did not already enjoy. Indeed, far from
attempting to establish their own religion, Catholics, in
their own view, merely wanted equality in response to the
majority's establishment of Protestantism. Among
Protestants, the education provided by the Public School
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Society seemed neutral and nonsectarian, but for
Catholics it was quite prejudicial.
As early as 1825, when the Common Council of
New York City first considered whether to distribute some
of its school fund to Catholic and other church schools,
advocates of the Public School Society argued that such a
disbursement would create a forbidden connection
between church and state. "The churches," they said,
"ought not to participate in this fund, because it would be
in violation of that rule of civil policy admitted to be
prevalent, which forbids all connection between matters
of Church and those of State. Upon this same policy, the
State's constitution had long forbidden 'any minister of
the gospel from holding any civil or military office."'
Although no one claimed that the New York constitution,
let alone its religious liberty clauses, actually required this
"policy" against a connection, the Common Council's
Law Committee perceived such a policy underlying the
state's constitution and, on this ground, recommended
that the Council deny funds to Catholic schools.
In 1840 the Protestant argument for separation
became more prominent. The year before, some upstate
Whig leaders, including Governor William Henry Seward
and Thurlow Weed, had attempted to counter the popu-
larity of their Jacksonian opponents by wooing Irish
Catholic voters with hints of educational equality-
Seward speaking of schools "in which their children shall
enjoy advantages of education equal to our own, with free
toleration of their peculiar creeds and instructions."
When Governor Seward presented such a proposal to the
legislature in January 1840, Catholics in New York City
petitioned the Common Council and then the Board of
Assistants to provide public funding for Catholic schools.
Other religious minorities soon joined the fray. Some Jews
and Scottish Presbyterians argued that they too should
receive funding. The Reformed Protestant Dutch Church,
however, protested that the Catholic proposal could only
be regarded as "in effect creating an odious union between
Church and State: an union, not less repugnant to the
sentiments and wishes of the Protestant portion of this
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community, than it is forbidden by the genius of our
republican institutions." Similarly, the Public School
Society protested, "The political compact by which these
United States are governed, divorced the unholy alliance
between Church and State."
The Board of Assistants' committee on schools
rejected the Catholic petition and, in its widely dissemi-
nated report, argued not merely against the alliance of
church and state, but for their separation. Using code
words that played upon popular fears of Catholicism, the
Committee hinted at the danger of religious bloodshed:
Religious zeal, degenerating into fanaticism and
bigotry, has covered many battle-fields with its
victims; the stake, the gibbet, and the prison
have fallen to the lot of countless martyrs; exile
from the land of their nativity, expulsion from
the seats of civilization to the wilderness of the
savage, have been experienced by hundreds, of
almost every sect, who could not honestly sub-
scribe to the religious opinions of the majority.
It was "[t]o prevent, in our day and country, the recur-
rence of scenes so abhorrent to every principle of justice,
humanity and right" that the constitutions of the United
States and of the states had "declared in some form or
other":
[T]hat there should be no establishment of reli-
gion by law; that the affairs of the State should
be kept entirely distinct from, and unconnected
with those of the Church; that every human
being should worship God, according to the
dictates of his own conscience; that all Churches
and religions should be supported by voluntary
contributions; and that no tax should ever be
imposed for the benefit of any denomination of
religion, for any cause, or under any pretense,
whatever.
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"These principles" (including the one that affairs of the
state were to be kept entirely "distinct" from, and "uncon-
nected" with, those of the church) were "either expressly
declared in the several Constitutions, or arise by necessary
implication from the nature of our governments, and the
character of our republican institutions." This was practi-
cally an admission that one of these principles, separation,
arose merely by "implication." Yet separation also had its
utility to recommend it: "The purity of the Church and
the safety of the State, are more surely obtained, by a dis-
tinct and separate existence of the two, than by their
union.
Notwithstanding these emphatic resolutions in favor
of separation of church and state, the allies of the Public
School Society seem briefly to have dropped their rhetoric
about separation when they were forced to admit that
they wanted students to continue to read the Bible and
other religious materials. The Public School Society
defended its position that its publicly supported schools
were nonsectarian by offering to black out the most bigot-
ed anti-Catholic references in its textbooks. It refused,
however, to withdraw the King James Bible, which,
although Protestant, no longer seemed to belong to any
one church. When the advocates of the Public School
Society initially had difficulty explaining why they sought
to keep the Bible, they apparently found it easier to
denounce Catholics than to argue from the principle of
separation. As John Hughes-soon to be appointed bish-
op-observed in the summer of 1841: "The charge of
Church and State is now no longer heard, and they appear
only to labor to prove that we are CATHOLICS, and, as
such, unworthy to be heard."
Although, in their desire to retain the Bible,
Protestants seem momentarily to have backed down from
insisting on a separation of church and state, they contin-
ued to accuse Catholics of uniting church and state:
And shall our Common Schools, the republic's
strongest hope
Be wielded by deceitful Priests, a Bishop or the
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Pope?
No! answers free-born millions; give them a trai-
tor s grave,
Advance, advance, Americans-your boasted
bulwarks save.
Loud sounds the sacred bugle, the American
youth dash on,
Base foreigners shall bite the ground-our war-
cry, Washington.
Accused of "aiming at the subversion of the Constitution,
and effecting a union between the State Government and
the Catholic Church," Catholics responded by throwing
these "absurd accusations" back at the Protestants. "We
have been charged with advocating the doctrine of the
'Union of Church and State!'And this, too when a union of
Church and State was one of the identical political heresies
against which we had so resolutely arrayed ourselves!" The
real threat of a union of church and state, Catholics
argued, came from the publicly funded schools, which,
under the guise of neutrality, imposed a nondenomina-
tional Protestantism on New York's children: "The present
Public School System of New York, we esteem as but the
old system of a LAW-ESTABLISHED CHURCH IN DISGUISE-a
scheme that seeks, by the sickly substitute of a State system
ofeducation to achieve the same end that was formerly
accomplished by the establishment of a State system of
Religion, namely, to promote certain religious doctrines, and
t[o] discountenance others. "To the nativist editor of the
Commercial Advertizer, Bishop Hughes complained:
"[Y]ou maintain 'the existence and necessity of a NATION-
AL PREDOMINANT RELIGION which is neither established
nor unestablished.' You maintain the necessity of a
scheme of public education, to which 'discontented frag-
ments MUST CONFORM, and towards which they can exer-
cise no veto power? This, sir, is strong language to use
toward a people who suppose themselves free."
Among the Protestants who understood the danger
of forcing a minority to submit to choices made by a
majority-even a heterogeneous majority-was John C.
29
Spencer. The secretary of state of New York and one of
Governor Seward's political allies, Spencer had recently
become a friend of Alexis de Tocqueville. Spencer and
Tocqueville had met in July 1831, when Tocqueville and
Gustave de Beaumont were visiting the United States to
interview Americans and learn about their society.
Responding to questions from the Frenchmen, Spencer
explained that in America "it's a generally accepted opin-
ion, in which I concur, that some sort of religion is neces-
sary to man in society, the more so the freer he is." In this
way, Spencer became the first to share with Tocqueville
this commonplace of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
American thought, which would make such a profound
impression upon the Frenchman and his understanding of
democracy. Spencer further told Tocqueville that the
Catholic religion was "less apt than the reformed to
accord with ideas of liberty," although the New Yorker
added that "if the [Catholic] clergy were entirely separated
from all temporal power, I cannot but believe that with
time it would regain the intellectual influence which natu-
rally belongs to it."
Seven years later, in 1838, Spencer edited the
American edition of Democracy in America, and in 1841,
in his position as secretary of state (and thus ex-officio
state superintendent of schools), Spencer proposed a
decentralized solution to the educational controversy-a
solution that would have allowed Catholics considerable
local control over their education. Spencer worried that,
although religious instruction was indispensable, it would
inevitably be somewhat sectarian and thus, under the
existing system, would unavoidably give offence to reli-
gious minorities. Indifferent to neither the danger of a
tyrannous majority nor the votes of the oppressed minori-
ty, he therefore suggested a plan of neighborhood control
that would shift power from the larger "masses" to the
smaller. The defect of the existing system was "necessarily
inherent in every form of organization, which places
under one control large masses of discordant materials,
which, from the nature of things, can not submit to any
control." Spencer therefore hoped to remedy the situation
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"by depriving the present system in New York, of its char-
acter of universality and exclusiveness, and by opening it
to the action of smaller masses, whose interests and opin-
ions may be consulted in their schools, so that every
denomination may freely enjoy its 'religious profession' in
the education of its youth." His decentralized neighbor-
hood approach had the advantage of breaking up the
"universality and exclusiveness" of the Protestant system
without distributing public funds to specifically Catholic
schools. Of course, Catholics were grateful. In New York
City, however, nativist Whigs resented the Catholic
alliance sought by Seward and Spencer and blocked the
proposal's enactment.
As it became clear that Seward and Spencer could
not deliver the support of their party, Catholics realized
they had to show their political power at the polls, and it
was in these circumstances, in October 1841, that Hughes
ventured to form his "Carroll Hall" ticket. In effect, he
raised the specter of an independent Catholic party. A
fateful step, which Hughes's enemies would never let him
forget, it provoked horror among many Protestants, both
Whigs and Democrats. Most immediately, in 1842 it
stimulated the Democrats, frightened that they might lose
Irish votes, to support a school bill that put New York
City schools under the control of local districts, where
they remained for the rest of the century.
Yet even this modest Catholic victory had a price: the
organization of nativists and the popularization of the
idea of separation between church and state. The threat of
overtly Catholic participation in politics appalled
Protestants, many of whom responded by forming and
joining anti-Catholic, nativist organizations. Most of
these groups denounced Catholicism in traditional anti-
establishment terms, not least as a union of church and
state. Some leading nativist organizations, however, went
further and demanded the separation of church and
state-a principle they understood to advance the liberty
of individuals by constraining churches, especially the
Catholic Church.
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With the concept of separation of church and state,
nativists could most clearly exclude Catholicism from the
public schools without removing Protestantism.
Protestants tended to assume that, whereas Catholics
acted as part of a church, Protestants acted in diverse sects
as individuals. Therefore, as the school-funding controver-
sy progressed, Protestants increasingly took for granted
that the separation of church and state forbade public
funding for Catholic education of any sort, even as it per-
mitted such funding for nonsectarian Protestant teaching.
In particular, from this perspective, separation allowed the
Bible to remain in public schools. The presence of the
Bible was desired by many sects and, indeed, by individu-
als rather than by any one sect. It therefore seemed that
Protestants did not act as a church and did not violate the
separation of church and state when they formed a major-
ity and placed the Bible in their publicly funded schools.
In 1845, in New York, the American Republicans
announced:
Our sole object is to form a barrier high and
eternal as the Andes, which shall forever separate
the Church from the State. While we regard the
religion of the Bible as the only legitimate ele-
ment of civilized society, and the single basis of
all good government, we are greatly opposed to
the introduction of sectarian dogmas into the
science of our civil institutions, or the incorpo-
ration of Church creeds into the political com-
pact of our government.
We believe the Holy Bible, without sectari-
an note or comment, to be a most proper and
necessary book, as well for our children as our-
selves, and we are determined that they shall not
be deprived of it, either in, or out of school.
Even more astonishingly, the Native Americans who
assembled in Philadelphia in 1844 declared: "We... rec-
ommend to the native Americans of the several states, in
their systems of education, a full recognition of the Bible,
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as Divine authority for the rights of man, as well as for the
separation of church and state, on which depends so
essentially the pursuit of happiness and freedom of con-
science. To the Bible we are indebted for the wand that
broke the scepter of tyrants, and crumbled to atoms the
church and state despotisms of those potentates, who
associate religion with their political systems." Far from
being a violation of separation of church and state, the
Bible, which had atomized church and state despotisms,
would reveal to students the divine authority for separa-
tion. In such ways the school-funding controversy led
nativists to identify with the separation of church and
state.
RESPONSES TO THE POPE
In the aftermath of the New York school dispute,
many Protestant ministers added their voices to the
nativist claims demanding separation of church and state
and thereby lent clerical respectability to an idea from
which they had earlier remained distant. A profoundly
significant shift in attitude, this change can be document-
ed in the evolving responses of the Protestant clergy to
Pope Gregory XVI's encyclical denunciation of separation.
Of course, vast numbers of clergymen continued to
value a connection between religion and government.
Even with the growth of Unitarianism, Universalism,
transcendentalism, and other deviations from orthodoxy,
many clergymen persisted in their adherence to a version
of Calvinism and, on this account, envisioned the church
as the religious and moral guide for the state. More gener-
ally, numerous clergymen, whether or not they were
orthodox, continued to assume that morality, freedom,
and government depended on a mutually cooperative and
even supportive relationship between government and
religion. Accordingly, many ministers still spoke about the
"connection" between religion and government that they
hoped would flourish all the more profoundly in the
absence of an establishment. Even the many others who
hesitated to speak of a connection, lest they seem ortho-
dox or seem to justify an establishment, at least refrained
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from endorsing separation, for fear that they would there-
by subvert the moral basis of free government.
Nonetheless, in opposition to the pope, some of these var-
ious clergymen would embrace the concept of separation
of church and state.
The pope had condemned the separation of church
and state when rejecting the stance taken by a small group
of European Catholic clerics and intellectuals. Perhaps fol-
lowing Condorcet, these liberal French Catholics opposed
the union of church and state by advocating separation.
Most prominently, the French cleric, Abb6 Lamennais,
together with his associates, supported separation in his
periodical, LAvenir. Eventually, the pope reprimanded
Lamennais, but this dissentient priest declared this intent
to continue publishing the journal. For the pope, this bla-
tant declaration of disobedience by one of his own clergy,
in support of a position that, in his view, encouraged the
state's indifference to religion, was intolerable. In this con-
text, in his 1832 encyclical, Mirari Vos, Gregory XVI con-
demned the separation of church and state. "Nor can we
augur more consoling consequences to religion and to
government, from the zeal of some to separate the church
from the state, and to burst the bond which unites the
priesthood to the Empire. For it is clear that this union is
dreaded by the profane lovers of liberty, only because it
has never failed to confer prosperity on both." It was a
reaction that gave all the more prominence to the idea of
separation. From this time, separation would increasingly
become an indispensable ideal of secularizing European
liberals. Of greater interest here, the pope's denunciation
of separation allows a measurement of how American cler-
ical opinion about separation changed in response to the
New York school debates.
Many American clergymen criticized the pope's pro-
nouncement against separation, and, among their
responses, a change can be detected. The pope's encyclical
seemed to confirm the worst suspicions of American
Protestants-that Catholicism threatened American liber-
ty, not least by uniting church and state. Yet, in their ini-
tial replies to the pope, American Protestant clergymen
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typically hesitated to endorse a separation of these institu-
tions, preferring, instead, merely to condemn the pope's
advocacy of a union. After the New York school contro-
versies, however, Protestants responded to Gregory's words
by demanding separation, which they declared to be an
American principle. For example, in 1843 clergymen of
various denominations organized the American Protestant
Association to "awaken" Americans to the "assaults of
Romanism," and, in this spirit, they embraced the separa-
tion that the pope rejected:
[W]e have it officially promulgated by the pre-
sent Pope, that LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, LIBERTY
OF OPINION, the LIBERTY OF THE PRESS, and the
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, are four of
the sorest evils with which a nation can be
cursed! Both as Protestants and as American citi-
zens, we count the rights which are here assailed
as among our dearest franchises: and we cannot
look on in silence and see the craft and power of
Rome systematically and insidiously employed
to subvert them.
Similarly, in his 1845 History ofRomanism, the English-
born Baptist, John Dowling, observed that in "its hostility
to the separation of church and state.. .Popery is even now
the same that we have seen it throughout the career of
ages... It might be expected that a power which is thus
bitterly hostile to liberty of opinion, should be equally
opposed to the separation ofchurch and state, which has
always been regarded by every enlightened friend of free-
dom, as one of the surest safeguards of the liberty of
nations." Protestant clergy were beginning to define their
liberty not only against the papal union of church and
state but also in favor of separation. Rejecting one
extreme, they were beginning to embrace another.
Among those who noticed some of the early steps in
this direction was an advocate of Sabbath legislation,
Harmon Kingsbury. He was one of the clergymen who
sought to preserve a middle ground, in which religion
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legitimately exercised influence without being legally
established. Increasingly, however, he felt himself on the
defensive, not least because he had to answer critics who
condemned his proposed Sabbath legislation as a union of
church and state. Some of these critics apparently even
desired a separation of these institutions. In response, in
1840 Kingsbury rejected both extremes. On the one
hand, to those who told him that he "would 'unite
Church and State,"' he responded that "only fools, the
devil, and his emissaries, would have them united,...for,
thus united, the Church falls." On the other hand, if "sepa-
rated, the State falls." Accordingly, Kingsbury took an
intermediate stance that both separated and united church
and state: "[P]roperly united and separated, they stand
and flourish together. Separate the Church and from the
State, in all her influence, and by going to pagan lands,
you may see in what condition the State would be. Unite
Church and State, and Europe can tell how many tales of
sorrow, scenes of discord and bloodshed, which have
occurred in consequence of it."
Notwithstanding such protests, American Protestant
clergymen increasingly responded to Catholicism and its
union of church and state by endorsing a separation. The
pope's response to Lamennais and other liberal European
Catholic clerics was understood by these American
Protestant clergymen to be an assault upon themselves,
and what the pope feared, they made an American ideal.
Ironically, these Americans thereby adopted the pope's
view that separation was the only alternative to the union
of church and state. This was but one indication that, fol-
lowing the first demands by American Catholics for equal
rights in American schools, many Protestant clergymen
abandoned their distaste for separation. In this way sepa-
ration became a respectable position not only among
nativist political organizations but also among Protestant
clergy. It was a change in posture with portentous conse-
quences for Catholics and, eventually, for vast numbers of
other Americans.
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POLITICS AND RELIGION
Many Protestants used the principle of separation to
argue against Catholic participation in politics. Catholics
had failed to remove Protestantism from most publicly
funded schools. Nonetheless, their demonstration of
political strength in limiting the attempts to impose
Protestantism upon their children made a profound
impression on many Protestants. In response, many
Protestants demanded that Catholics separate themselves
from American politics.
The most outspoken of the Protestants who made
these demands desired to "Americanize America." For
example, one nativist political organization, the American
Party, sought to develop even among native-born citizens
the "national characteristics of which they have heretofore
been unmindful." Similarly, in its "higher and holier"
aspirations, the American Republican Party hoped to dis-
place other religious or ethnic affiliations: "TO NATIONAL-
IZE THE INSTITUTIONS OF OUR LAND, AND TO IDENTIFY
OURSELVES ALONE WITH OUR COUNTRY."
In their zealous defense of this Americanism, these
nativists argued that foreign-born Catholics who voted in
a bloc endangered the republic. In part, the threat was
that Catholics would use their political power to unite
church and state. " The American Ballot Box, then, is to be
the battleground of European Monarchy and Papal
Superstition"-a battleground on which Catholics
planned "to vanquish our Republican Institutions, and
organize a party in Political Power, in favor of the inten-
tions of the Pope!" It was "dangerous to commit the bal-
lot-box, the Ark ofour Freedom's Covenant, to foreign
hands"-to persons who "may be foreigners in heart, and
American inform only." More fundamentally, many
Protestants feared Catholicism in American politics
because of the authority claimed by the Church-an
authority that in its breadth, its apparent inflexibility, and
its hierarchical character appeared to deprive Catholics of
the independence that increasingly seemed essential in cit-
izens and voters. According to the nativist editor and
politician, Thomas Whitney: "The individual who places
37
his conscience in the keeping of another, divests himself of
all individuality, and becomes the creature, the very slave
of his conscience-keeper. In every sense, moral, social, and
religious, he becomes a mere instrument, and as a natural
consequence his whole being, his happiness or misery, his
successes and defeats, his condition and circumstances, all
are made dependent on the will or caprice of another."
Divested of individuality, Catholics lacked the essential
qualification for voting: "The exercise of the right of suf-
frage is, in its legitimate sense, an intellectual act; and the
conferring of that right upon minds like these-minds
incapable of understanding the purport or power of the
ballot-seems little less than an act of madness or imbe-
cility." Of course, in complaining that Catholics failed to
exercise their individual judgment, nativists said as much
about themselves as about Catholicism, for what irked
nativists was that Catholics exercised their judgment in
deference to the wrong authorities. As one nativist candid-
ly explained, the Catholic laity "needs to have a proper
direction and example set, from which to mold their
opinions and principles."
Many nativists opposed Catholic suffrage and other
Catholic threats to American politics by demanding a sep-
aration of church and state. To be sure, numerous advo-
cates of Americanism said nothing at all about separation
and merely accused Catholics of wanting to unite church
and state-a formulation attractive to the Protestants who
regretted any establishment but still perceived the necessi-
ty of a moral connection between government and the
Christian church. Other nativists similarly hesitated to
reject a connection but wanted to seem bold and therefore
went out of their way to sound as if they desired a separa-
tion. For example, in 1845 in Philadelphia the American
Party demanded "the universal toleration of every reli-
gious faith and sect, and the total separation of all sectari-
anism and politics." According to the American's Text-
Book, "We would preserve separate and inviolable our
political and religious liberty." Desirous of preserving
"immaculate that other light, which is 'light from
Heaven,"' the author of the Text-Book, quoting Paine,
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"would sever forever the adulterous connection between the
Church and the State-between the Throne and the
Altar." These nativists used language suggestive of separa-
tion but did not go so far as to demand separation of
church and state. Some advocates of Americanism, how-
ever, were not so hesitant. As one nativist explained: "The
Republicans profess to take a stand against Church and
State connection in any form. They wish to keep the
Church from interfering to control State action. This
principle of non-interference is a sound and constitutional
one. It is the Republican principle, and should be boldly
and openly maintained by every Republican, no matter
what his creed and politics. Church interference in the
affairs of the State never has resulted in good."
Notwithstanding the apparently positive sound of
the principle of separation of church and state, it was, as
nativists occasionally conceded, part of a campaign to
limit the freedom of Catholics. One nativist stated: "The
profession of any particular creed or rule of religious faith,
unconnected with civil matters or the rights and interests
of those differing in opinion therefrom, has justly been
regarded as a right which no one in this country is justi-
fied in disturbing or destroying." By implication, it was
justifiable to "disturb" even the mere "profession" of a
creed or faith that was connected with civil matters.
Similarly, American Republicans "as a Political Party,
entertain no unfriendly feelings whatever toward any
Religious Institution, disconnected with the politics ofour
country, and which does not SEEK an alliance with matters
of State." They were "disposed to extend a free and impar-
tial toleration to All. But while we do this, it should be-
MUST be-upon the condition that they or any of them,
shall not interfere with the civil and political departments
of City, State, or Union." Merely by believing in the
authority of their church-a church that defended a
union of church and state-and merely by speaking,
meeting, voting, and otherwise participating in American
politics with a sense of their Catholic identity, Catholics
seemed to connect their church to civil government, and,
for this, they deserved to lose their religious liberty.
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Among those who condemned nativist "proscription"
and "intolerance" were many southerners, who regularly
adopted the concept of separation in order to turn it
against its more bigoted proponents. In Louisville, at a
mass meeting at the "Whig Pavilion," the local Whigs cas-
tigated a nativist newspaper article that reflected upon
"the Catholic persuasion, and especially the Catholic
priesthood, charging them [the Catholics] with hostility
to American liberty." In response to the article, those pre-
sent at the meeting resolved: "That the Whigs of this city
regard the continued separation of Church and State as
essential to the perpetuity of our free institutions; and we
hereby denounce the efforts of the Locofoco party to array
against each other the different religious persuasions, and
to create a line of political demarcation between the
Protestants and the Catholics, as subversive of the best
interests of religion and inimical to the perpetuity of civil
and religious liberty." Similarly, the Jewish Democratic
congressman from Alabama, Philip Phillips, "treated the
movement of the 'Know Nothings' as a direct attack upon
the constitution itself."
There is nothing clearer than that in the forma-
tion of the constitution it was intended emphat-
ically to exclude all connection with any reli-
gious faith whatever. Separation of Church and
State, eternal divorce between civil and ecclesias-
tical jurisdiction, were cardinal principles with
the sages and patriots to whom not only we, but
all mankind, are indebted for this model of a
republican government.
Adopting the nativist principle of separation, he asked:
"When before has it been found proper to introduce reli-
gion into our political organizations? When before was
the fitness for political office tested not by the honesty or
capability of the candidate, but by the religious faith he
professed?"
Southern nativists who were Catholic or who had
Catholic constituents joined the resistance to nativist
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intolerance. For example, Representative George Eustis of
Louisiana rejected the prejudice of his fellow advocates of
separation: "I am in favor of maintaining and keeping up
the divorce between Church and State which has been
established by our great fathers. But, sir, that very same
reason which makes me a deadly enemy of Catholic inter-
ference with our institutions, makes me blush for my
countrymen when I see the Protestant Church soiling its
robes by dragging them in the mire of politics. Your legis-
latures are filled with gentlemen who wear white cravats
and black coats. Your Congress has a large proportion of
these clerical gentlemen. And I ask you, with all due
respect and all due courtesy to gentlemen of the cloth, to
show me a Catholic priest or an accredited agent of the
Church of Rome in this hall. Gentlemen who talk about
the Pope of Rome ought to recollect that poor old man,
who is an object of such terror to them, is now in the cus-
tody of a guard of French Soldiers."
It is striking that many of those who condemned
anti-Catholic prejudice felt obliged to declare their sup-
port for separation. Nativists claimed to speak for "true"
Americans and impressed upon their contemporaries the
necessity of conforming to "American" ideals. Accordingly,
even those who denounced nativist intolerance-perhaps
especially these Americans-were quick to declare their
own support for American principles, particularly separa-
tion. In this way, opponents of anti-Catholicism ended up
adopting an anti-Catholic ideal.
Of course, the accusations of intolerance irked most
nativists, who thought of themselves as idealistic advocates
of liberty. Nativists felt they were simply protecting
American politics and freedom from the influence of
churches. One nativist protested: "The truth is, no party
more earnestly opposes connecting the affairs of church
and State, in any manner, than the American party; and it
is because we will tolerate no influence which any reli-
gious body is disposed to bring to bear upon the politics
of the day-because we promptly and frequently rebuke
such intolerant and impertinent interference-that this
charge is frequently iterated and re-iterated against us."
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Condemning the "intolerant and impertinent interfer-
ence" of "any religious body," nativists assumed they were
opposing intolerance and preserving liberty.
HUGHES'S DEFENSE
Catholics defended their right to engage in politics
on behalf of their religious liberty, and none did so more
prominently than Bishop John Hughes of New York. In
1840 this determined Irish American priest had led the
fight over publicly funded schools, and, after his appoint-
ment in 1842 as bishop of New York, he continued vig-
orously to defend the rights of his coreligionists. On the
basis of this personal experience, he understood that, if
Catholics were to preserve their freedom, they had to be
bold, but they could never appear to be engaged in parti-
san politics.
Hughes resented accusations in the press that
Catholics confused religion and politics more than did
Protestants, especially as Catholics merely spoke and
voted to defend themselves from an aggressive majority:
When several strong denominations attack one
that is weaker, in a manner which turns religion
into politics, and politics into religion, the sen-
tinels of our liberties at the press are asleep. But
when that one assailed denomination meets the
assault and repels the assailants with the same
weapons which the latter had selected, then the
danger of mixing religion with politics, is for the
first time trumpeted in the public ear! If
Protestants mingle religion with politics to
abridge the Catholics of a common right, it is
all well enough; but if Catholics do the same for
the purpose of protecting common rights, then
it is all wrong.
The real threat of a union of church and state came from
the tyranny of the Protestant majority. "If ever the spirit
or the letter of the Constitution of the country shall be
violated in this particular, it will happen, not from any
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one sect rising above and lording it over all others, but
from the coalition of all the others to depress, first the
weakest or most unpopular, and then the next, and so on,
until finally a few of the most powerful will arise and
remain in the ascendant." Therefore, as Hughes told a
sympathetic crowd, all Americans had to demand equal
protection, particularly for the weak:
It behooves you all, therefore, and every citizen,
to see that all are protected alike-the weakest
as well as the strongest, but the weakest especial-
ly. No matter what sect is assailed, extend to it,
in common with all your fellow citizens, a pro-
tecting hand. If the Jew is opposed, then stand
by the Jew. [Loud and long-continued cheer-
ing.] Thus will all be secured alike in the com-
mon enjoyment of the blessings of civil and reli-
gious liberty, and the justly obnoxious union of
Church and State be most effectually prevented.
Against a Protestant union of church and state, minori-
ties-especially non-Protestant minorities-had to unite.
Hughes emphasized that Catholics were engaged not
in a political contest, but in a struggle for their liberty.
"Our meetings are not then political; we meet for the pur-
pose of... extracting light that we may see, and under-
stand, and be enabled to vindicate our rights. Neither
should it be wondered at by political men that we should
assemble here to discuss the question of our rights, and
that we should complain of our grievances....If they tickle
us we must laugh-if they bruise us we must complain."
To the extent Catholics engaged in politics, he claimed,
they only acted in self-defense: "Now I agree with the
public press in the principle, that one of the greatest evils
which could happen to society is the mixture of religion
with politics. But in the application of that principle, I
hold that it is those who first introduce the evil, who
employ it in assailing the common rights of others; and
not those who employ it in their own defense, who are
entitled to blame." Protestants had first introduced the
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evil by insisting that Catholic political activity "was 'union
of Church and State,'-'bringing religion into politics,' a
'Roman Catholic Bishop in the political arena,' etc., etc."
Yet, "(niot a word or syllable of truth in all this! It was
simply a pastor warning his flock against a politico-reli-
gious intrigue already sprung upon them, having for its
object to brand the word 'Ignorance' on the foreheads of
their children, as the penalty of not conforming to the sec-
tarianism of the public schools."
Yet Hughes had to go further in disclaiming political
participation. In the early 1850s nativists in New York
and elsewhere adopted church property laws that attempt-
ed to deprive Catholic bishops of control over Catholic
churches-a measure designed to shift authority to the
laity and to Protestantize the Catholic Church.
Proponents of this assault on the Catholic Church some-
times defended it as a sort of separation, as when one
nativist leader sanctimoniously explained: "The purity of
the clergy, depends upon their separation from the secu-
larizing tendencies of politics and power. There can be no
just respect for that office, when associated with secular
affairs." Of course, the secular affairs from which the
Catholic clergy were to be separated most prominently
included their property, which many nativists eagerly
hoped would escheat to the state. Amid these threatening
demands, Hughes felt obliged to declare his complete
rejection of politics. He admitted one instance of "med-
dling with politics"-his formation of the Carroll Hall
ticket in 1841-but "in no other case have I ever aided or
abetted, or been in connection with any political party, or
any individual of any party since the world began. On the
contrary, when I was appointed to take charge of this dio-
cese, I prescribed for its numerous clergy, as a rule of con-
duct, to abstain from all interference in politics. I did not
deny them the right to vote as other citizens merely in
consequence of their being clergymen. That right I believe
they have seldom if at all exercised. I myself have not exer-
cised it." A Catholic cleric, he could not admit that he
engaged in politics, and he even felt a need to refrain from
voting.
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THE PROTESTANT CLERGY
In contrast to Hughes, who felt obliged to proclaim
his abstention from politics, Protestant ministers had no
need to be so delicate. Protestant ministers tended to view
themselves as the moral light of the nation, and vast num-
bers of them did not hesitate to participate in politics in
ways Catholics could not afford.
Much of the Protestant clergy had never substantially
involved themselves in partisan politics or had withdrawn
from it. In early nineteenth-century New England, for
example, most Baptist preachers ignored party politics,
and many Congregationalist ministers, chastened by their
experiences surrounding the 1800 election, withdrew
from party conflicts. Yet these and increasingly many
other Protestant clergymen turned their energies to the
social crusades that would shape nineteenth-century
America, and, in this way, they reentered politics.
Attentive to the risks of direct support for partisan poli-
tics, and less engaged than they once had been in disputes
about the next world, the evangelical clergy, especially in
the North, found new ways to participate in the struggles
of this world, learning to preach not against Jefferson, but
against the removal of the Cherokees, against the delivery
of mail on Sundays, and, with more success, against alco-
hol and slavery.
Unashamedly and even militantly engaged in the cul-
tural and social politics of the nation, the vast body of
Protestant clergymen felt free to preach on almost any
issue. From the pulpit of New York's Bleeker Street
Church, Thomas Skinner-a Presbyterian clergyman-
explained in 1850:
[T]hough the Church in this land be separate
from the State, there is no power which can be
brought into action in favor of the nation's hap-
piness, equal to that of the Pulpit.... [T]here is
no place near or remote, no person high or low,
no subject whether of politics, legislation,
morals, religion, science or art, to which it may
not boldly apply its appropriate influence,
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under protection of the government, so long as
it violates no one's civil rights. This privilege has
the American Pulpit. Its field is boundless,... the
Gospel ministry is the best friend to all human
interests, national and individual; the State will
reverence and cherish, though it cannot espouse,
the Church; and the peace of our rising and
spreading Republic, will flow as a river, and its
righteousness as the waves of the sea.
He acknowledged: "The Pulpit is often charged with
occupying a sphere not its own, and there teaching against
the Gospel, in its strictures on civil and political matters."
This, however, would not stop him: "Ministers of the
Gospel are not to hold themselves aloof from observing or
criticizing the doings of magistrates and politicians. The
kingdom of Christ, though not of this world, is over all
kings and kingdoms, and governments of whatsoever
kind; and of this kingdom the earthly administrators are
Ministers of the Gospel; and if they do not appropriately
assert the universal supremacy of its Lord and its laws,
there is no unfaithfulness so great as that of which they
are guilty." Skinner was a Protestant and could afford to
be audacious.
In the mid-1850s, when Hughes had to go so far as
to proclaim that he did not vote, the Protestant clergy felt
no need to demonstrate such restraint. Against the
Nebraska bill, which left open the possibility of slavery in
the Kansas and Nebraska territories, Protestant ministers
in New England and New York preached over 3,200 ser-
mons in the space of only six weeks, and more than 3,000
New England clergymen signed a memorial to Congress.
Of course, these Protestants had no concern about violat-
ing the separation of church and state:
The undersigned, clergymen of different reli-
gious denominations in New England, hereby,
in the name of Almighty God, and in his pres-
ence, do solemnly protest against the passage of
what is known as the Nebraska Bill, or any
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repeal or modification of the existing legal pro-
hibitions of slavery in that part of our national
domain which it is proposed to organize into
the territories of Nebraska and Kansas. We
protest against it as a great moral wrong, as a
breach of faith eminently unjust to the moral
principles of the community, and subversive of
all confidence in national engagements; as a
measure full of danger to the peace and even the
existence of our beloved Union, and exposing us
to the righteous judgments of the Almighty: and
your protestants, as in duty bound, will ever
pray.
When these New Englanders presented themselves to
Congress as clergymen rather than as citizens and even
presumed to speak "in the name of Almighty God,"
southerners expostulated about political preaching, the
union of church and state, and the subordination of the
state to the church. Yet these southern critics carefully
limited their attacks. Even from the assiduous author of a
6 00-page tract against the offending northern clergy came
the conclusion: "The question is not, whether clergymen
have the same rights, politically, as other citizens; this no
one denies; but their indulgence in political
preaching... presents a subject for prudential considera-
tion alone, as it affects their usefulness among those
amidst whom they labor."
In contrast, the Catholic clergy had to show more
caution. Far more than the Federalist ministers in 1800 or
the Protestant clergy of New England in 1854, the
Catholic clergy found it difficult simultaneously to fulfill
the duties of a clergyman and to exercise the rights of citi-
zenship.
AN AMERICAN PRINCIPLE AND THE COMING
CONFLICT
Fearful of the threat from Catholics and their clergy,
Protestants viewed the separation of church and state as
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an embattled principle of American government that they
would soon have to defend in a final conflict with the
Catholic Church. At stake, these Protestants assumed, was
nothing less than American constitutional freedom and
the possibility that it would be replaced with Roman
ecclesiastical servitude.
For nativists, separation seemed a principle of
American constitutions, even if not precisely guaranteed
in any of these documents. The various religion clauses of
the federal and state constitutions had all distinguished
religion from government in one way or another, and, on
this basis, nativists casually assumed that separation was
the nation's underlying constitutional principle of reli-
gious liberty. According to Daniel Ullmann-the Yale-
educated lawyer and Know Nothing candidate for gover-
nor of New York in 1854-"All these constitutions aim to
provide against spiritual domination and to establish full
personal religious freedom. In this, the nation agrees in all
its utterances-written Constitutions and unwritten law.
The general sentiment, and the settled determination-
the profound convictions of the American people are, that
there shall be, forever, under this government, an entire
and absolute separation between church and state; and
that perfect, full religious liberty shall always exist."
Taking these sentiments to the height of religion itself, he
envisioned "the Temple of American Liberty': "Let the
mighty fabric rise, its majestic dome swelling in all its
magnificent proportions, until it reaches the heavens."
Shortly afterward, in 1856, in his Outlook ofFreedom or
The Roman Catholic Element in American History, Justin
D. Fulton echoed Ullmann's thoughts. One of the most
popular of nativist writers, this Baptist-who would go
on to write such classics as Why Priests Should Wed (1884)
and Washington in the Lap ofRome (1888)-argued that
the religious liberty clauses of the federal and state consti-
tutions, although "uttered in different forms," concurred
in "these two fundamental principles: first, that there shall
be no connection between church and state; and secondly,
that religious liberty, the rights of conscience, and free-
dom to worship...are guaranteed to the citizens of the
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United States." Just as the Declaration of Independence
"made every man feel his individuality-his sovereign-
ty"-so too American constitutions evinced the principle
of separation.
Following the Civil War, when the crisis over slavery
no longer eclipsed anti-Catholicism, many theological lib-
erals and nativist Protestants feared that the nation stood
on the brink of another great constitutional struggle-this
time with the Catholic Church over the principle of sepa-
ration. For example, in 1870 a former judge of the New
York Supreme Court, Elisha P. Hurlbut, argued that there
was an irreconcilable conflict between "Democracy and
Theocracy"-a conflict "stronger and fiercer" than that
between "freedom and slavery." This was not mere hyper-
bole, for Hurlbut thought that "[t]here are bondmen still
on our soil, subjects of a foreign tyranny, in comparison
with whose bondage, African slavery, with intellectual
freedom, was as nought." Fearing that democracy and the-
ology "cannot coexist in the same nation, without deadly
strife until a triumph is secured to one or the other, " he
argued that "the theocracy of Rome and the democracy of
America, being utterly antagonistic, have no other way to
peace, but by an entire separation." Indeed, "There can
exist an American Catholic church, as well as an American
Protestant church; and all can freely worship the Divine
Power of the Universe, without interfering with each
other, or endangering the peace of the state; provided they
all concur in sinking the theocratic element in civil gov-
ernment, and carry not one iota of it to the polls." To this
end, Hurlbut published a proposal for a constitutional
amendment that would alter the First Amendment to give
the federal government power to enact "such laws as it
shall deem necessary to control or prevent the establishment or
continuance ofany foreign hierarchical power in this country,
founded on principles or dogmas antagonistic to republican
institutions. " In a less lawyerly fashion, he proposed:
"Suppose then, we indulge in a familiar piece of surgery,
and cut the umbilical cord which binds the spiritual feetus
of America to the great mother of superstition, and thus
stunt a growth, whose completed proportions would be
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likely, upon a successful delivery, to ruin the nurse into
whose arms it should fall. It is not murder for the midwife
humanely to stifle the birth of a monster." Such was
Hurlbut's remedy for the pope's "spiritual imperium with-
in our democratic imperio." Commenting on Hurlbut's
constitutional proposal, Orestes Brownson pointed out
that it would give the government "the power to suppress
any church or religious institution that is based on a theo-
ry or principle different from its own." It would thus
rewrite and nullify "the very amendment" that denied
Congress "the power to prohibit to any one the free exer-
cise of his religion!"
A year later, in 1871, the Rev. Henry W. Bellows
spoke in even more dire terms about the battle over sepa-
ration. A radical Unitarian who "craved popularity,"
Bellows had already, two decades earlier, entered the fray
against Bishop Hughes, arguing that " a new struggle has
begun between the Catholic Church and the Protestant."
This was a struggle "between the elements of religious
authority and religious liberty"-between "a conscience in
charge of a church and a conscience in charge of its
owner." Now, in 1871, shortly after the Civil War,
Bellows felt obliged to warn Catholics of their fate if they
continued to threaten American liberty by failing to keep
church and state separate:
Will the American people-a Christian,
Protestant nation-see any form of sacramental,
hierarchical, theological priestcraft, getting pos-
session of their politics and government, cheat-
ing them before their very eyes out of their
rights and liberties, and not, sooner or later,
treat it just as they treated slavery?-nay, over-
ride the Constitution to save the nation threat-
ened with a government of priests?
It is the certainty of this result, so much
more fearful for them than for us, that makes it
the duty of Protestants to warn the Catholic
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hierarchy and the politicians that support them,
wither they are tending; while they carefully
cleanse their own skirts from every stain of
political commerce, or want of fidelity to the
fundamental law that keeps Church and State
apart in our country.
Protestants would resort to a civil war, even an unconsti-
tutional conflict, against Catholics who entered politics in
violation of the principle of separation. Therefore, it was
incumbent upon responsible Protestant preachers to warn
Catholics of the danger they risked at the hands of free-
dom-loving Americans.
Again, Orestes Brownson recognized the violence of
the prejudice. Catholics had merely voted to protect their
religious liberty, and, "as long as any religion, even the
reading of the Bible, is insisted on in the public
schools,.. .what is to prevent Catholic citizens from mak-
ing it a political question and withholding their votes
from the party that refuses to respect their rights of con-
science and to do them justice?" The retort from Bellows,
as understood by Brownson, was grim: "we [Catholics]
cannot legally be prevented from doing so, but, if we do
so, it will be the worse for us; for if we carry our religion
to the polls the Protestant people will, as they should, rise
up against us and overwhelm us by their immense majori-
ty, perhaps even exterminate us."
Of course, not all Protestants went to these extremes,
but many feared or could be induced to fear an impend-
ing conflict between Roman slavery and Republican free-
dom-often depicted as a contest between Catholic union
and American separation. Without carefully examining
the history of the notion of separation, numerous
Protestants concluded that the Catholic Church had long
been at war against this principle. In particular, they
looked back at the history of Christianity and of America
and observed Catholic opposition to ideas of religious lib-
erty that, in retrospect, they easily and conveniently con-
fused with separation. Accordingly, these Protestants
believed they were approaching the culmination of an his-
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toric struggle with the Catholic Church. For example,
Joseph Smith Van Dyke wrote that "Romanism" had long
been hostile to "the separation of Church and State,"
which was a "principle of our national life" and "which
Protestants have ever viewed as one of the defences of civil
liberty." This principle "has been and now is the object of
incessant attack"-as evidenced by the popes who "for the
last thousand years" had "pronounced it a 'damnable
heresy."' So popular was this fantasy that national politi-
cians sought votes by writing about it. For example, in
1876, in his The Papacy and the Civil Power, a leading
Republican, Richard W. Thompson, contributed to his
party's victory in the presidential election by reminding
voters of the struggle for separation and individual free-
dom:
The two systems stand in direct antagonism
with each other. The Protestant has separated
the State from the Church; the papal proposes
to unite them again. The Protestant had found-
ed its civil institutions upon the will of the
people; the papal proposes to reconstruct and
found them upon the will ofthe pope. The
Protestant secures religious freedom; the papal
requires that every man shall give up his con-
science to the keeping of ecclesiastical superiors.
Incidentally, in observing these tensions, Thomson, like
so many other Protestants, linked the Church's claims of
political authority to its claims of theological authority-
the fundamental problem being that, for Catholics, "the
personality of the believer is merged in the superior per-
sonality of the pope." It was a view one Catholic reviewer
called "sheer, unmitigated twaddle."
With these dire visions of the Catholic Church and
its threat to the political and mental freedom of individu-
als, many Protestants found satisfaction in conceiving of
their religious liberty, especially their freedom from estab-
lishments, as a separation of church and state. In so doing,
they took for granted that separation was a principle of
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government with historical foundations vaguely evident in
American constitutions. Yet they repeatedly revealed that
it had a more substantial basis in their fears of the
Catholic Church and in their contrasting sense of their
own individual independence as Protestants and
Americans.
53
